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A Willing International Federalist? 
The UK’s Pivotal Role within the United 
Nations 
 
Nigel D White 
I. Introduction 
At the outset of his 2006 analysis of the past, present and future of the United Nations, 
the historian Paul Kennedy cites the poem by Alfred Lord Tennyson, ‘Locksley Hall’, 
published in 1837. A few lines from that poem are quoted here: 
For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see, 
Saw the vision of the world, and all the wonders that would be; 
… 
Till the war-drum throbb’d no longer, and the battle flags were furl’d 
In the Parliament of Man, the federation of the world. 
 
There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe, 
And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law. 
Kennedy concludes that the UN General Assembly comes closest to the idea of a 
‘Parliament of Man’,1 seating representatives of all 193 Member States, but its powers 
are weak in comparison to the Security Council, the ‘executive’ organ of the UN, which 
in turn seats the executives of the five permanent members (including the UK), along 
with those of 10 non-permanent members. Nonetheless, the composition, functions and 
powers of the principal political organs of the United Nations seem to fall a long way 
short of the ‘federation of the world’ dreamt of by Tennyson. 
                                                 
1 P Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations (London, 
HarperCollins, 2006) 208. 
  It is unusual to discuss the United Nations as the central component in a 
federalising international order but it must be remembered that ‘federalism’ is not a 
precise concept. Livingston wrote in 1952 of a ‘spectrum of federal societies’; stating 
further: 
This is no less true of federalism than it is of any other form of political organisation. 
Federalism is a function not of constitutions but of societies. Viewed in this way, it 
will be seen that federalism is not an absolute but a relative term; there is no specific 
point at which a society ceases to be unified and becomes diversified.2 
Eschewing any standard definition of ‘federalism’ at the outset, this chapter explores 
the use of the term, and other forms of organisation, in the context of the League of 
Nations and the United Nations, focusing in particular on the UK’s role in shaping those 
organisations and being a key member of them. The question then raised is whether 
harnessing the coercive powers of enforcement given to the Security Council is 
evidence of a federalising international order, moreover one with the potential to by-
pass the rule of law in the UK? As with federalism, the concept of the ‘rule of law’ is 
contested but for the purposes of this chapter is deployed in the broad sense identified 
by Waldron: that ‘respect for the law can take the edge off human political power, 
making it less objectionable, less dangerous, more benign and more respectful’.3 Rule 
of law compliance is a term used in this chapter to indicate that the balance between 
politics and law, particularly in the context of decision-making, leans more towards 
compliance with legal principles, norms and rules than policies, power, political 
expediency or discretion. 
 The chapter considers how the UK combines arguments of the supremacy of 
security obligations produced by decisions of the Security Council with executive 
expediency with the result that decisions at the level of the Security Council are 
implemented in a way that is not rule of law compliant. The chapter could have centred 
upon decisions to use force under UN auspices, when arguments that deployment of 
UK troops or military assets take place under a UN mandate win over Parliament and 
the Courts.4 Rather the choice has been to focus attention on non-forcible measures 
                                                 
2 WS Livingston, ‘A Note on the Nature of Federalism’ (1952) 67 Political Science Quarterly 81 at 88. 
See also I Bernier, International Legal Aspects of Federalism (London, Longman, 1973) 3–6. 
3 J Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 137 
at 159. 
4 See ND White, Democracy Goes to War: British Military Deployments and International Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2009) 82–112. 
 mainly because they go further than authorisations to use force in that they impact 
internally within the domestic legal order. 
 The danger highlighted in this chapter is that, rather than the earth being covered 
by universal laws agreed to by all nations as envisaged by Tennyson, 188 nations are 
being ruled by five, at least on security matters and, moreover, ruled by an organ whose 
responsibility is for enforcing and keeping the peace rather upholding international law. 
The chapter examines the UK’s engagement and interaction with the UN’s political and 
legal order in order to discern evidence of the development of a rudimentary 
international federal structure. In particular, the move since 1999 towards targeted 
sanctions as well as more general Security Council legislation against terrorism has 
enabled the UK to implement laws without any real accountability. Judicial 
accountability has increased, however, but is either readily by-passed or is not strong 
enough. In contrast with its approach to the EU, where it was a reluctant international 
federalist until the recent referendum in June 2016 and will now withdraw from that 
federalising order in the next two to three years, the UK’s position as a permanent 
member of the Security Council means that it is a willing participant in such 
developments, although it would not recognise the use of federal terminology in this 
context. While the UK is anti-federalist in the context of the EU, it is generally pro-
internationalist, but not explicitly pro-federalist, in the context of the UN. 
 In order to understand and assess the development of a rudimentary form of 
federalising international legal order through the UN the chapter contrasts the UN 
Charter with its predecessor, where debates about possible federal structures gave way 
to a cooperative model. The early sections show how the UN Charter was a radical 
departure from the consensual approach embodied in the Covenant, which contrasts 
with the orthodox portrayal of the Charter as simply an improvement on the Covenant. 
The chapter then examines how non-forcible measures are brought within the UK legal 
order through the United Nations Act 1946, and how the implementation in the UK of 
targeted sanctions and legislative measures imposed by the Security Council have 
departed from the original intent of that Act. The chapter then shows how that change 
of use has been combined with sustained arguments by the UK government that 
obligations arising under the UN Charter prevail over other treaty obligations, including 
under human rights treaties, to introduce a draconian system of sanctions against listed 
individuals within the UK legal order, and how both the legal and political order has 
 failed to provide these individuals with adequate protection from the state. The chapter 
concludes by arguing that for this growing international form of federalism to be rule 
of law compliant requires greater critical scrutiny of executive action by both 
Parliament and the judiciary.  
II. The UK and the League of Nations 
At the end of the First World War there was a debate amongst statesmen and other 
leading figures about ways to secure peace in Europe, whether by a universal 
association of states (the League of Nations model), which would not threaten 
sovereignty, or by a regional federation, which might. Giovanni Agnelli, founder of the 
FIAT motor company, and Attilio Cabiati an Italian economist, argued: 
Without hesitation we believe that, if we really want to make war in Europe a 
phenomenon which cannot be repeated, there is only one way to do so and we must be 
outspoken enough to consider it: a federation of European states under a central power 
which governs them. Any other milder version is but a delusion.5  
While the experiment in European union did not start until after the Second World War, 
the League of Nations became a reality in 1919. The League of Nations was not 
conceived as a federation even by its most ardent supporters, but it did facilitate the 
continuation of existing federations in the form of empires. US President Wilson, 
credited with being the idealist behind the Covenant, held views that were tainted with 
a belief in the supremacy of ‘white civilization’.6 In this respect Wilson shared a vision 
of the ‘civilising’ mission of white peoples with the victorious colonial powers—Britain 
and France—as well as the South African statesman, Jan Smuts, who was very 
influential in shaping both the League of Nations’ Covenant of 1919 and the UN Charter 
of 1945.  
 Smuts argued in 1917 that a Commonwealth of Nations should emerge from the 
British Empire, which he described as the ‘only successful experiment in international 
government’, making it clear that the ‘Commonwealth’ would be a continuation of 
empire, albeit an ‘enlightened’ one, where non-white peoples would be under the 
                                                 
5 G Agnelli and A. Cabiati, Federazione europea o lega delle nazioni? (Turin, Fratelli Bocca, 1918), in 
(1989) 31 The Federalist 71. 
6 A Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of World Order (London, Penguin, 2015) 60, 
92. 
 tutelage of democratic civilised nations.7 Smuts rejected the autocratic military 
imperialism of Germany in favour of a liberal form of imperialism offered by Britain, 
and it was that view which was preserved not only by the Covenant in 1919 but, 
arguably, also by the UN Charter of 1945,8 at least until the General Assembly adopted 
the Declaration on Decolonisation of 1960.9 As will be seen, the UN Charter contained 
pro-federal provisions in matters of security but, in 1945 at least, it did not attempt to 
dismantle empires. 
 One view of the First World War was that it was a fight for empire: Germany 
was fighting to gain an empire, while the UK and France were fighting to keep theirs. 
In August 1916 Wilson spoke of ‘England having the earth and of Germany wanting 
it’.10 The First World War was in part a battle to continue empires, a dispute over their 
ownership; it was not a dispute to remove that model at least until the US, in particular 
President Wilson, became involved. Even his vision did not contain a clear declaration 
of democracy and self-determination for all, but a ‘gradated view of the capacity for 
self-government that was typical of nineteenth-century liberalism’.11 However, but 
ideologically his vision remained a more radical form of liberalism than the ‘imperial 
liberalism’ offered by the colonial powers.12 
 The surrender of Germany in 1918 was as much due to a collapse of its economy 
as it was to a military victory by the Allies,13 so it is not surprising that the first attempt 
at a world organisation put emphasis on economic sanctions as a means of ensuring 
compliance with the norms of the Covenant and that, beyond an acceptance that naval 
blockades would enforce sanctions, collective military action was kept as a much more 
vague concept in the background.14 Prime Minister Clemenceau of France argued for 
an international army, reflecting French concerns about future German aggression, but 
                                                 
7 M Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United 
Nations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009) 37–45. 
8 ibid at 63–65. 
9 UN Doc A/RES/1514 (1960). 
10 Tooze above n 6 at 45. 
11 ibid at5 121. See President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 8 January 1918, Point 5.  
12 ibid at 179. 
13 ibid at 39. 
14 Art 16 League of Nations Covenant 1919. 
 these were not acceptable to the British and the Americans.15 The right to go to ‘war’, 
although curtailed by the terms of the Covenant at least, was ultimately remained a 
decision for each sovereign state.16  
 Nonetheless, the Covenant was arguably a purer expression of ‘peace through 
law’ than its successor: this was in part explained by the vestiges of Wilsonian idealism 
that remained in the final draft; in part by a shared belief that correct and open legal 
procedures would have prevented the outbreak of the Great War; in part because it more 
accurately reflected the limited nature of international law than its successor; and 
finally, in part, because it was not premised on a totally vanquished enemy. Although 
the Treaty of Versailles has since been seen as notorious for the reparations it imposed 
on Germany,17 it, and the Covenant which was part of it, were premised on respect for 
Germany as a nation state,18 (although Germany’s period of membership of the League 
only lasted from 1926–33). In contrast, the total defeat of Germany at the end of the 
Second World War led to its dismemberment, a condition that prevailed until the end 
of the Cold War. The Covenant had respect for sovereign equality at its heart, at least 
amongst what Wilson would have called the nation states of ‘white civilisation’, while 
the UN Charter was premised on Great Power supremacy and the complete defeat and 
rebuilding of ‘enemy’ states in the liberal democratic mould.  
 In summary, the League of Nations Covenant was reaction to the First World 
War in that it was constructed in a way to prevent such a war, but it was constructed on 
the basis that what was needed was better inter-governmental cooperation between 
European rivals rather than the creation of any international federal structure, though it 
did preserve federal-like empires. It did not anticipate the sort of radical belligerence of 
Nazi Germany, or indeed the rise of an ideologically driven Soviet Union. While the 
Allies agreed to an armistice with Germany in November 1918, nothing short of 
complete annihilation of Germany was acceptable in 1945. While the League was 
envisaged as a form of cooperation between sovereign equals based on the rule of 
international law as it then stood (with empire at its heart), the UN was envisaged as a 
                                                 
15 Tooze above n 6 at 264. 
16 See, for example, Art 12 League of Nations Covenant 1919. 
17 Tooze above n 6 at 249. 
18 ibid at 272. 
 continuation of the international executive created to combat Axis aggression formed 
by the Allies in 1942;19 in which stress was given to threats to the peace rather than 
breaches of international law. In contrast to the UN, the League ‘could not be formed 
during the war since that would make it into an instrument of the victors’.20 In contrast 
to the UN Charter, the first draft of the Covenant was ‘put together in a matter of a 
fortnight’ by the League of Nations Commission in February 1919, after the war had 
ended.21 In some ways the UN could be seen as a move away from law, when compared 
to the League, but on the other hand the League was seen as a failure and the Covenant 
too weak to provide anything like a system of collective security. That required a move 
towards supranationalism in the Security Council of the UN, arguably sowing within it 
the seeds of federalism. 
III. The Covenant and the Charter 
It is commonly assumed that the second experiment in universal collective security—
the United Nations—remedied the defects of the League of Nations. However, in 
addressing the deficiencies of the League the founding states of the UN attributed 
powers to the Security Council that were outside (or exceptional to) the existing 
structures of international law. Even as the network of consensual international laws 
rapidly expanded post-1945, the Security Council, though largely inactive during the 
Cold War, was empowered to make legally binding decisions that could cut through or 
by-pass that network. It is worth considering the constitutive treaties of the League and 
the UN as a comparative exercise to demonstrate that, despite changes in nomenclature 
they are in some ways different versions of the same thing, but with one profound 
difference—the insertion of a new form of legal power that combined great power 
politics and supranationalism.  
 Writing in 1947, Goodrich, one of the leading commentators on the Charter, 
was keen to point out that there was clear continuation between the League and the UN. 
Goodrich saw both as ‘cooperative enterprises falling within the category of leagues 
                                                 
19 Declaration by the United Nations, 1 January 1942. 
20 Tooze above n 6 at 223. 
21 ibid at 255. 
 and confederations’,22 with one exception. The exception was the presence of collective 
enforcement action by the UN Security Council, which could be taken against the will 
of a Member State or States.23 Nonetheless, Goodrich saw the League as a continuation 
of the Concert of Europe of 1815, and the UN as a continuation of the League: the UN 
is seen as ‘the continued application of old ideas and methods with some changes 
deemed necessary in the light of past experience’.24 
 Writing in 1946 Brierly, on the other hand, analysed the UN not as a 
continuation of the League in terms of improving the cooperative model of collective 
security, but as a radically different experiment in international organisation.25 The 
League of Nations, although based on a constitutional document,26 only set up an 
association of states, it did not purport to set up the beginnings of a system of world 
government. The League’s effectiveness depended upon the ‘conduct of the members 
individually’, and their willingness to comply with their obligations; meaning that they 
could ‘not be made to act together, and a majority of them’ could ‘not decide or act for 
the whole body’.27 References in the Covenant were to the ‘members of the League’, 
who undertook to act in certain ways, except for Article 11(1), which stated that the 
‘League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the 
peace of nations’—dismissed as a ‘mere slip in drafting’ by Brierly.28 Sovereign 
equality for independent states meant exactly that under the Covenant; whereas under 
the UN Charter, there was a distinct move away from ‘the purely cooperative basis of 
international organization’,29 and, it is argued here, from the consensual basis of 
international law, which is one of the reasons why the Charter is so much longer than 
the Covenant (111 articles compared to 26). The Covenant contained the outlines of a 
Constitution, enabling members to adjust the workings of the Council and Assembly to 
                                                 
22 LM Goodrich, ‘From League of Nations to United Nations’ (1947) 1 International Organization 3 at 
8. 
23 ibid at 10. 
24 ibid at 5. 
25 JL Brierly, ‘The Covenant and the Charter’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International Law 83. 
26 AD McNair, ‘The Functions and Different Legal Character of Treaties’ (1930) 11 British Yearbook of 
International Law 100 at 112.  
27 Brierly above n 25 at 85. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid. 
 suit, whilst the Charter contained details on the powers of each UN organ, and gave 
decision making competence to the Security Council.30 In this respect Brierly went 
much deeper in his analysis of the Charter than Goodrich. For Brierly, the move towards 
greater constitutionalisation and institutionalisation in the Charter was fraught with 
problems. 
 The first draft of the UN Charter, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of 1944, was 
essentially predicated on Germany and Japan continuing to pose the greatest threat to 
world peace, as they were still immensely powerful (at least outwardly) in 1944—hence 
the draft captured idea of a police force for the world based on the continuation of the 
alliance of the Second World War into the post-1945 era. In contrast to the First World 
War that had been stumbled into, the Second World War involved planned aggression 
and, therefore, required executive-style government to prevent it happening again. The 
consensus at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco wrongly assumed that the ‘wartime 
unity of purpose among the Great Powers would be a permanent feature of their 
international relations’.31  
 Brierly saw the clear political differences within the permanent membership as 
a fatal flaw: ‘the Covenant scheme had weaknesses … and perhaps it might not have 
worked even if it had been given a fair trial’,32  
but we must realize that what we have done is to exchange a scheme which might or 
might not have worked for one which cannot work, and that instead of limiting the 
sovereignty of states we have actually extended the sovereignty of the Great Powers, 
the only states whose sovereignty is still a formidable reality in the modern world.33  
Brierly’s criticism is based on the permanent members failing to cooperate, something 
which largely proved to be correct for the first 45 years of the UN’s existence. Whereas 
he did foresee the potential for world government within the Charter he did not foresee 
its actualisation.  
 The fact that the Charter was more clearly based on the power politics of the 
post-Second World War period, and that it has helped cement those configurations of 
power and imbue them with the potential not only to enforce peace and security but 
                                                 
30 Art 25 UN Charter 1945. 
31 Brierly above n 25 at 91. 
32 ibid at 91–92. 
33 ibid at 93. 
 also to make binding laws, explains its survival but, unfortunately, it did not signify an 
advancement in international law. While we might point to the ban on the use of force 
in the Charter being normatively stronger than the qualified ban on aggression in the 
Covenant,34 the fact is that this has not prevented great power aggressions on a regular 
and continuing basis: not only during the Cold War, but in the post-Cold War period, 
for example: in Iraq 2003, Georgia 2008 and Ukraine 2014. The Covenant may have 
been ineffectual, and it may have been flawed, but it did signify the start of an era of 
constitutionalist thinking in international relations and law, one where a world order 
built on fundamental principles of law might be envisaged.  
 In contrast, the normative strengths of the Charter, found particularly in its 
principles in Article 2, were undermined by the centrality of the Security Council to 
those principles. The ban on the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) had an exception 
in the right of self-defence for states in response to armed attacks in Article 51, but had 
a much broader exception in the shape of military action undertaken by the Security 
Council under Article 42. The principle of non-intervention by the UN in domestic 
affairs, found in Article 2(7) of the Charter, was inapplicable when the Security Council 
was taking enforcement action under Chapter VII. The triggers for Security Council 
action were not actual or potential breaches of international law, but threats to or 
breaches of the peace (Article 39); and, lastly, obligations upon states created under the 
Charter by Security Council decisions (Article 25) were potentially superior to other 
conflicting obligations by virtue of the primacy clause (Article 103); meaning that 
obligations created to deal with security matters potentially prevail over conflicting 
binding treaty commitments. While in domestic legal orders, rights may be overridden 
in extreme emergencies (eg to prevent the spread of fire or disease),35 under the UN 
system the sense of emergency predominates, meaning that legal rights and duties are 
weakened and always potentially overridden by political decisions on matters of 
security, albeit ones having legal effects. 
 Of course Brierly was right in the sense that the veto provides a real political 
check on the extensive use of supranational powers by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII, but the potential is there when the deadlock is broken to create a form of 
                                                 
34 Compare Art 2(4) of the UN Charter 1945 with Art 10 Covenant of the League of Nations 1919. 
35 H Kelsen, Collective Security under International Law (Washington, Naval War College, 1957) 102. 
 supranationalism, particularly when post 9/11 consensus was achieved over responses 
to security threats such as terrorism, foreign fighters and weapons of mass destruction. 
These are indeed security concerns, but the Security Council is empowered to tackle 
them, not simply as an executive body taking action to enforce existing norms, but 
rather as a central political organ acting as a ‘governing board’ with both law-making 
and executive powers,36 so that by determining that there exists a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, it can create obligations binding on the wider 
membership, and enforceable by means of a range of non-forcible and forcible 
measures.37  
IV. The UK and the UN 
There were certainly ambitious ideas for international organisation debated in the UK 
Parliament towards the end of the Second World War. War-time Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill spoke in visionary terms in May 1944 about the intention to ‘set up 
a world order and organisations, equipped with all the necessary attributes of power, in 
order to prevent the breaking out of future wars, or the long planning of them in 
advance, by restless and ambitious nations’. This would require ‘a World Council, a 
controlling Council, comprising the greatest States which emerge victorious from this 
war’ as well as a ‘World Assembly of all Powers’.38 The leader in The Times of 27 June 
1945 summed up the mixture of ‘hopes and misgivings’ surrounding the debates around 
the adoption of the UN Charter: 
It is far more widely recognized than it was in 1919 that no international instrument, 
no constitutional specific, will suffice to maintain peace … The Charter by itself is 
nothing, if it fails to rally the loyalty of the major Powers who alone can give it body 
and life.39 
                                                 
36 HG Schermers and NM Blokker, International Institutional Law 5th edn (Leiden, Nijhoff, 2011) 310–
15. 
37 Arts 25, 39, 41 and 42 UN Charter 1945. 
38 Hansard, HC Debates, vol 400, col 784, 24 May 1944. 
39 Cited in GL Goodwin, Britain and the United Nations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1957) 45–
46. 
 Nonetheless, in August 1945, in presenting the Charter to the House of Commons for 
approval, Prime Minister Clement Attlee foresaw the Security Council as embodying 
the centralisation of force as well as methods of dispute settlement: 
The British delegation [at San Francisco] took a foremost part in seeking to make the 
Security Council something more than a policeman who is called in when there is 
already a danger of a breach of the peace. We sought, and sought successfully, to 
make it a place where the policies of States, and especially the greater States, could be 
discussed and reconsidered for the time, especially when they showed signs of 
divergencies as to threaten the harmony of international relations. Collective security 
is not merely a promise to act when an emergency occurs, but it is active co-operation 
to prevent emergencies occurring …40  
There is some evidence that British leaders saw the UN, in particular the Security 
Council, as a form of supranational power or, perhaps more reluctantly, a federation of 
great powers, in which the UK, along with the other permanent members, exercised 
powers rather than being subject to them.  
 The powers granted to the ‘federal government’ element of the UN are vast. The 
right or power of a federal government to use force within constituent states in order to 
maintain security and stability is a deeply problematic one even within established 
federal states (eg Russian use of force in Chechnya), but even more so when the right 
is exercised at the international level. Nonetheless, the Security Council was granted 
the power to forcefully intervene in Member States under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. However, the UK’s position as one of the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council signifies that it cannot be the direct object of UN intervention against 
its will, thereby limiting the effects on the UK of the supranational powers of the UN 
provided for in the Charter.  
 During the Cold War, the effects of obligations created by the Security Council 
on the UK were limited to duties to carry out measures in the rare instances when they 
were adopted against other states. The UK used its permanent seat to protect it from 
intervention in a variety of ways, not always involving the use of the veto.41 For instance 
in 1969, the Republic of Ireland requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider 
the situation in Northern Ireland with a view to deploying a UN peacekeeping force to 
the province because of the serious disturbances caused by the alleged denial of civil 
                                                 
40 Hansard HC Debates, vol 413, col 665, 22 August 1945. 
41 Contained in Art 27(3) UN Charter 1945. 
 rights to the minority Catholic community.42 Although the question was not even put 
on the agenda of the Security Council, the UK ambassador, Lord Caradon, was 
sufficiently perturbed that he justified the closing down of any discussion of Northern 
Ireland on the grounds that it was purely a domestic matter and so there was no threat 
to international peace.43 Any proposal would have been vetoed by the UK in any event 
but the UK was able to use its position to prevent the matter progressing that far. 
Similarly in the situation in Southern Rhodesia in 1965, the UK initially used its 
position to prevent discussion of the matter on the basis that this was a domestic 
matter,44 until it had clearly lost control over its colony following the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the white minority regime in 1965. Thereafter, the UK 
was active in seeking, and gaining, support for the imposition of comprehensive 
sanctions against Rhodesia,45 and also the enforcement of the oil embargo element by 
means of an authorisation to intercept oil supplies reaching Rhodesia through the port 
of Beira in Mozambique.46 
 The potential loss of the permanent seat by the UK in a future reformed Security 
Council would mean that UN-authorised intervention against it would become possible. 
The referendum on Scottish independence of 2014 caused speculation in regard to the 
permanent seat.47 UN practice indicates that when a state breaks away from another, the 
new state has to apply for membership of the UN, while what remains of the old state 
continues membership particularly if it is the larger unit.48 This would indicate that the 
(rump) UK would continue its seat in the UN, but it might not be able to control 
challenges to its permanent seat on the Security Council, given that the claims of 
Germany, Japan, Brazil and many others are simmering not far from the surface as the 
membership of the Security Council is long overdue a significant overhaul. 
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 V. Legislating for Executive Action: The United Nations Act 
1946 
The UN Charter’s provisions on the centralisation of the use of force under UN 
command are indicative of an intent to create a central power with military forces at its 
disposal,49 but the failure to agree the military arrangements necessary to make this a 
reality meant that UN authorised military action remained decentralised and based on 
states volunteering for UN action. The Cold War prevented such actions being 
authorised, with the singular exception of the Korean War that broke out in 1950 when, 
in the absence of the Soviet Union, the Security Council recommended that military 
action be taken to repel the attack against South Korea and to restore international peace 
and security in the area.50 The UK supported the resolution and contributed significantly 
to the campaign against North Korea. Those forces, although US-led, were commonly 
known as ‘United Nations forces’.51 The UK was also instrumental in drafting a General 
Assembly Resolution that supported the unification of Korea,52 leading to military 
action in the north that provoked massive Chinese intervention, which eventually led to 
a cessation of hostilities along the 38th parallel in 1953.  
 The UK’s sovereignty was not affected by the Charter’s provisions on collective 
military security in that under the system that has emerged the UK cannot be obliged to 
provide troops. In contrast, Parliament provided for the rapid incorporation into 
domestic law of obligations to undertake non-forcible measures (sanctions) arising 
from decisions made under Article 41 of the UN Charter, in the shape of the United 
Nations Act 1946. Section 1 of that Act provides: 
If, under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations signed at San Francisco on 26 
June 1945 (being the article which relates to measures not involving the use of armed 
force) the Security Council of the United Nations calls upon His Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom to apply any measures to give effect to any 
decision of that Council, His Majesty may by order in Council make such provision as 
appears to Him necessary or expedient for enabling those measures to be effectively 
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 applied, including … provision for the apprehension, trial and punishment of persons 
offending against that Order … 
It was envisaged that Member States would be obliged to enforce UN sanctions against 
a target state, but that would necessitate incorporation of those obligations into the 
domestic laws of the sanctioning states; by, for example, prohibiting persons or 
companies within their jurisdiction trading or having other forms of commercial, 
economic or financial relations with or within the target state. The target of the 
sanctions would be a state that the Security Council determined had threatened or 
breached international peace, not individuals or companies, although if individuals or 
companies traded or otherwise commercially, financially or economically interacted 
with the target state they should be punished within the domestic legal orders of 
Member States. This was the basis upon which both the House of Lords and the House 
of Commons welcomed the United Nations Bill when it was introduced in 1946, the 
government declaring that Article 41 was the only Charter provision that required 
immediate legislation to enable the UK to fulfil its obligations under the Charter.53  
 In the Ahmed case of 2010,54 the first case decided by the UK Supreme Court, 
and one involving a new form of UN sanctions—measures targeted directly at 
individuals—Lord Hope stated that  
there was no indication during the debates at the Second Reading in either House [in 
1946] that it was envisaged that the Security Council would find it necessary under 
article 41 to require states to impose restraints or take coercive measures against their 
own citizens.55  
Parliamentary debates in 1946 indicated that the form of incorporation into domestic 
law—by an Order in Council made by the executive that was not subject to 
Parliamentary scrutiny—was a procedure that had ‘the necessary combination of speed 
and authority to enable instant effect to be given to the international obligations to 
which we are pledged’.56 Those debates made it clear that non-forcible measures were 
directed against states.57 As Lord Hope stated in the Ahmed case: ‘the use of the power 
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 as a means of imposing restraints or the taking of coercive measures targeted against 
individuals in domestic law is an entirely different matter’.58 
 Targeted sanctions against individuals are implemented in the domestic legal 
order by the very organ of government that voted for them in the Security Council—
the executive; thereby making the Order in Council a formality. In this way they appear 
to be a manifestation of federalism whereby legal obligations arise in the UK legal order 
as a consequence of the exercise of the Security Council’s discretionary governing 
powers in matters of peace and security and, when seen in this way, those obligations 
are a result of executive decisions that are not rule of law compliant. Individuals can be 
listed by the Security Council or, indeed, by the UK following its obligations under 
general Security Council resolutions, on the basis of limited evidence (or intelligence) 
without significant due process and, furthermore, those targeted by such measures can 
remain listed indefinitely. Those targeted individuals are represented as threats to the 
peace and, as such, are subject to emergency measures that are exceptional to the normal 
protections provided by international and domestic human rights norms, civil liberties 
and criminal justice.  
 Following the Ahmed case in 2010, the system of executive orders based on the 
United Nations Act 1946 was replaced by the Terrorist Asset Freezing etc Act 2010. 
But even when obligations arising under Article 41 are adopted into UK law by means 
of this Act of Parliament, there is little willingness in Parliament to scrutinise 
obligations arising from Security Council decisions in terms of their compatibility with 
other international obligations accepted by the UK or, indeed, the existing laws of the 
UK providing for the protection of rights and freedoms.59 Furthermore, giving the 
terrorist assets freezing regime a new legislative platform in 2010 did not alter the basic 
method by which the executive (ie the Treasury) is empowered to either temporarily 
list individuals on the basis of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that they are or have been 
involved in terrorism or, more permanently, on the basis of a ‘reasonable belief’. Even 
supporters of the Act could discern no clear difference between ‘reasonable belief’ and 
‘reasonable suspicion’, except that they were both below the ‘balance of probabilities’ 
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 standard of evidence required in civil cases.60 Only one MP questioned the legal basis 
upon which the executive and not the courts could impose assets freezing orders.61 
There is little political will in Parliament to challenge executive decisions made on 
security matters. Indeed, the fact that such obligations result from decisions of the 
Security Council is almost seen as putting them beyond domestic political scrutiny.62 
Judicial scrutiny has also been hampered by a reluctance to challenge the executive on 
security matters and, although cases like Ahmed suggest greater judicial activism, 
reluctance remains in cases where the executive is implementing its security obligations 
arising from the UN Charter.  
VI. Targeted Sanctions Regimes 
The effects on the civilian population of the UN’s comprehensive sanctions regime 
against Iraq (1990–2003), which severely undermined the rights to life and health of 
large sections of the civilian population especially children,63 led to the development of 
less indiscriminate targeted or smart sanctions against regime elites and non-state 
actors. As a permanent member, the UK is a strong supporter of this development, often 
associated with the ‘1267’ regime first imposed in 1999 by the Security Council against 
the Taliban government in Afghanistan (for its support for Al-Qaida),64 and then 
directly against Al-Qaida itself. Security Council Resolution 1333 of 2000 required all 
states (not just Member States) inter alia to  
freeze without delay funds and other financial assets of Usama bin Laden and 
individuals and entities associated with him as designated by the Committee, 
including those in the Al-Qaida organization, and including funds derived or 
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by Usama bin 
Laden and individuals and entities associated with him.65  
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 The Resolution invoked the language of the primacy clause of the Charter (Article 103) 
by calling upon all states to  
to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution, notwithstanding the 
existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international 
agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the 
date of coming into force of the measures imposed.66  
However, the absolute primacy suggested by this provision has to be balanced by 
statements in other Security Council resolutions, which declared that states ‘must 
ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under 
international law, and should adopt measures in accordance with international law, in 
particular human rights, refugee and humanitarian law’.67  
 Furthermore, the Security Council has made concessions in the face of 
judgments of courts around the world, including those discussed below, giving targeted 
individuals seeking delisting avenues for bringing their claims. However, these 
concessions are administrative processes rather than judicial protections. It is 
interesting to note that review of allegedly wrongful listings by the Ombudsperson 
established by Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009) only applies to those on the 
Al-Qaida Sanctions List as administered by the Security Council’s 1267 Committee 
and not to any lists beyond that, including the Taliban list. This seemingly curious 
anomaly is only explicable by the overarching pragmatism of the Security Council on 
matters of accountability for wrongly listing individuals; in that complaints to 
international, regional and judicial bodies have largely derived from the 1267 list and 
the office of the Ombudsperson is a response to that. The lack of remedies elsewhere in 
the UN system, for wrongly listed individuals, puts the creation of the Ombudsperson 
in perspective, but it also fits the prevailing view in the Security Council that such 
measures are administrative ones taken in response to international threats to security 
caused by the activities of international terrorist organisations and, therefore, any 
remedial measures should only be of a controlled administrative nature. However, long-
term listing of individuals constitutes a form of punishment that raises issues of access 
to legal remedies for violations of due process norms located in the international human 
rights obligations of states.  
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  Although targeted sanctions imposed against Al-Qaida dominate debates, there 
were prior instances in the 1990s of targeted sanctions imposed against regime elites in 
Haiti and non-state armed groups (UNITA in Angola and the Bosnian Serbs).68 The 
twenty-first century has seen numerous sanctions regimes against regime elites (in 
Libya, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, North Korea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Eritrea, South 
Sudan and Yemen), and non-state actors (in DR Congo, the CAR, Cote D’Ivoire, 
Lebanon, and Sudan, Libya, and against Islamic State).69 These non-state actors and the 
threats they represent are not confined to the boundaries of one state and, therefore, the 
obligations created could potentially impact on the legal order within the UK. In 
supporting sanctions against Islamic State (by adding members from that group to the 
existing Al-Qaida list),70 the UK representative on the Security Council welcomed the 
unanimous and rapid adoption of the measures,71 showing that consensus can readily be 
achieved on non-forcible measures directed against terrorism.  
 Security Council resolutions directed at foreign terrorist fighters (individuals 
travelling from their national state to another state for the purpose of carrying out 
terrorist activities) demonstrate the broadening legislative scope of its non-forcible 
measures. Adopted in September 2014, Resolution 2178 was in part directed at the 
individuals themselves in that it contained a demand ‘that all foreign terrorist fighters 
disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in armed conflict’. It was also 
directed at ‘all states’, obliging them to ensure ‘effective border controls’, and 
encouraging them to ‘employ evidence-based traveller risk assessment and screening 
procedures including collection and analysis of travel data, without resorting to 
profiling based on stereotypes founded on grounds of discrimination prohibited by 
international law’. With reference to listing processes already in place and states’ 
general counter-terrorist obligations under Resolution 1373 (2001), Resolution 2178 
(2014), inter alia decided that ‘all States shall ensure that their domestic laws and 
regulations establish serious criminal offences sufficient to provide the ability to 
prosecute and to penalize’ foreign terrorist fighters in a manner duly reflecting the 
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 seriousness of the offence. These measures were implemented in the UK within a 
broader counter-terrorist framework in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
that, inter alia, restricted the travel of individuals involved in terrorism-related activity 
and also provided for their temporary exclusion in order to protect the British public 
from a risk of terrorism, as well as provision for the necessary amendments to the TPIM 
(terrorism prevention and investigation measures) regime.72  
VII. General International Legislation in Resolution 1373 (2001) 
Once a consensus is formed in the permanent membership of the Security Council 
around a concept as nebulous as terrorism, the power of the Security Council comes 
close to a form of supranational or central federal government, imposing obligations on 
all states to take measures against a range of non-state actors, wherever they are located 
in the world. The focus of the Security Council on peace and security means that it 
cannot be a world government in any full sense but, given the priority in the UN system 
for peace and security, and the broad normative meaning given to both ‘peace’ and 
‘security’ evidenced by an expansive understanding of what constitutes threats to the 
peace within the Security Council, it has a greater range and impact than an executive 
organ simply responding to emergencies. Its targeted sanctions regimes against named 
actors have a longevity that belies emergencies but, moreover, its general legislative-
type resolution on terrorism, Resolution 1373 of 2001, has opened up the possibility 
enabling states to tackle their domestic security problems while purporting to fulfil their 
obligations arising under the Resolution. This is particularly so given that the Security 
Council defines all forms of terrorism as threats to international peace and,73 although 
the Security Council did offer an understanding of terrorism in a Resolution of 2004, it 
is not an internationally agreed definition and does not appear to have led to conformity 
by states in their domestic definitions of terrorism.74 The Security Council’s ‘definition’ 
is built on offences already proscribed in the numerous international treaties on various 
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 aspect of terrorism, while in contrast, the definition of terrorism in the UK contained in 
section 1 of the Terrorism Act of 2000 is not so proscribed.  
 In the case of targeted sanctions imposed against suspected terrorists or terrorist 
supporters, the temporary freezing of an individual’s assets, and restriction of his or her 
movements, can be construed as administrative measures necessary to prevent threats 
from terrorism manifesting in indiscriminate acts of violence. As such they are not 
arguably subject to full due process protections. However, a number of listings appear 
to be almost permanent without real review, and like indefinite preventive detention, 
cease to be responses to imminent existential threats but are rather forms of punishment 
without due process of law. There is a danger that by creating a legal framework 
allowing for quasi-permanent listings, the UN is endorsing a system of punishment for 
wrongs determined by executive organs of states and organisations without any 
determination or trial before a court. As is the case with targeted killings, the roles of 
judge, jury and executioner are rolled together. This is even more so as regards the auto-
interpretation system of targeted measures triggered by Resolution 1373 of 2001. This 
piece of UN Security Council law-making has legitimated the development of separate 
‘lists’ of terrorists by Member States, fulfilling their obligations under that resolution 
to: criminalise the financing of terrorism; freeze any funds related to persons involved 
in acts of terrorism; deny all form of financial support for terrorist groups; and suppress 
the provision of safe haven, sustenance or support for terrorists.75 Given that there are 
no specific terrorist organisations listed in the Resolution, or by a collective process set 
up by the Resolution, states are given discretion to target those organisations and 
individuals it considers to be terrorists. The Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010 is 
the current legislative platform for the implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001) in the 
UK. The 2010 Act provides the UK government (HM Treasury) with powers to freeze 
the funds and economic resources of those suspected or believed to be involved in 
terrorist activities, and restricts the making available of funds, financial services and 
economic resources to, or for the benefit of, such persons. It was adopted as a direct 
response to the UK Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in the Ahmed case.76 
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 VIII. Arguing for the Absolute Primacy of UN Obligations 
While the UK’s permanent seat and right of veto protects it from UN-authorised 
forcible intervention, the increasing focus of the Security Council, with the UK to the 
fore, on taking non-forcible measures against non-state actors, has meant that the effects 
of Charter obligations arising by dint of Security Council decisions have been felt 
within the UK’s legal order. The identification of individuals to be targeted, either at 
UN level or at national level under the auspices of decisions made by the Security 
Council, has led to their freedoms being restricted and so to legal challenges that their 
rights have been violated. The advantage to the UK in securing obligatory Chapter VII 
resolutions against individuals is that they not only used to legitimate targeted measures 
and, thereby, avoid significant Parliamentary scrutiny, but also that the UK government 
has consistently argued that the obligations arising thereunder override the UK’s other 
treaty commitments that are in conflict, pointing to Article 103 of the UN Charter by 
which ‘obligations’ arising under the Charter ‘shall prevail’ over conflicting treaty 
obligations.  
 The beginning of this line of argument can be traced to the time when the 
Security Council imposed sanctions imposed against Libya, at the instigation of the UK 
and US, aimed at forcing Libya to hand over two Libyan agents suspected of the 
Lockerbie bombing of 1998.77 In defending itself against a case brought by Libya to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1992, to the effect that Libya had the right to 
prosecute two suspects under existing international treaty commitments,78 the UK and 
US both relied on Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter to claim that obligations arising 
from Security Council resolutions prevailed over Libya’s rights and duties under the 
Montreal Convention of 1971. In the Lockerbie cases, the ICJ accepted this argument 
‘prima facie’ at the provisional measures stage in 1992,79 and, as the case did not reach 
the Merits stage when the issue would have been addressed in full, this interpretation 
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 has been the one relied upon by the UK in subsequent cases brought against it before 
national and regional courts. 
 The UK government has extended its primacy argument to argue that 
obligations arising from Security Council decisions prevail over those duties it has 
under human rights treaties, both in defending itself against claims brought by targeted 
individuals and intervening in other key cases. It intervened in the Kadi case of 2008, 
brought against the European Community before the European Court of Justice, arguing 
that obligations arising under the Charter prevailed over fundamental rights.80 However, 
the Court, in emphasising that the Community was based on the rule of law, held that 
the right to be heard as well as property rights of the plaintiff who had been listed by 
the Security Council’s 1267 Committee were violated by the European regulation that 
gave force to Security Council Resolutions.81  
 Undeterred the UK has continued to argue for absolute primacy of security 
obligations derived from Security Council resolutions, in cases involving listing of 
suspected terrorists and other measures that restrict liberty. In the Al-Jedda case of 2007 
brought against the UK, the government argued that the right to be free from arbitrary 
detention, guaranteed by Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was 
overridden by the obligation to detain contained in a Security Council resolution 
authorising the US and UK forces in Iraq to take necessary measures, including 
detention, for imperative reasons of security.82 The House of Lords upheld this 
argument, with Lord Bingham stating that obligations arising from the UN Charter must 
be respected above all else: ‘emphasis has often been laid on the special character of 
the European Convention as a human rights instrument. But the reference in article 103 
[of the UN Charter] to “any other international agreement” leaves no room for any 
excepted category…’83 The European Court of Human Rights disagreed in 2011, but 
primarily on the basis that the Resolution in question did not expressly impose any 
obligation on states to detain, thereby leaving open the possibility that the Security 
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 Council could override human rights obligations of states simply by using express 
language to that effect.84  
 The UK has persisted in its contention about the overriding effect of obligations 
arising under the Charter as a result of Security Council resolutions, notably in cases 
where an individual has been listed at Security Council level. In the Nada case in 2012 
brought against Switzerland before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights, the UK intervened claiming that in the case in question the Security 
Council had used ‘clear and explicit language’ in Resolution 1267 of 1999 to impose 
obligations on states that would prevail over conflicting obligations under human rights 
treaties.85 However, even though the Court accepted that this was a case of clearly 
conflicting obligations, it explored the latitude the Swiss government had in 
implementing its obligations arising under the Resolution to make its actions as human 
rights compliant as possible.86 The UK intervened in the Al-Dulimi case of 2013 brought 
against Switzerland before a chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, 
repeating its argument about the prevailing effect of obligations arising under the 
Charter over conflicting human rights obligations.87 The Court found that targeted 
measures, directed at individuals and non-state actors in Saddam Hussein’s regime in 
Iraq,88 violated the right of access to a court under Articles 6 and 13 of the European 
Convention, despite there being a direct conflict in obligations for a state between those 
arising from the UN Charter and those arising from Security Council resolutions.89  
 It would appear that the UK government has gradually lost the argument that 
the Security Council can create a form of security law that is automatically 
constitutionally superior even to human rights norms. At the very least the European 
courts will rigorously test those claims and will not simply give precedence to security 
obligations. However, the following analysis will show that these judgments at the 
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 European level have not yet been accepted by the UK government, nor has the UK 
Supreme Court adjusted its jurisprudence to accept a human rights challenge to 
wrongful listing claims. The UK government, as a permanent member of the UN’s 
executive body, supports a form of absolute primacy or supremacy for obligations 
arising from Security Council resolutions, as it enables it to use domestic executive 
orders to introduce immediately binding, unscrutinised and superior laws into UK 
domestic law. In purely pragmatic terms the UK’s reluctance to give up, or substantially 
qualify, this form of UN-level federal law-making is understandable, particularly as it 
gives the government a very effective way of tackling suspected terrorists that is 
operated largely without hindrance from political and judicial forms of accountability.  
IX. Supranational Measures within the Domestic Legal and 
Political Order 
The impact of obligations arising under Security Council resolutions imposing non-
forcible measures targeted at individuals, necessitating enforcement of such measures 
within domestic legal orders of Member States, has given rise to jurisprudence in 
domestic courts,90 regional courts,91 and under the individual complaint mechanism to 
the Human Rights Committee.92 Before UK courts the key judgment is the Ahmed case 
decided by the UK Supreme Court in 2010, in which the Court was at the same time 
highly critical of the targeted sanctions regime and, as it proved, very limited in 
changing the effects of such measures on the lives of individuals. Lord Hope described 
the impact of the executive orders in the following terms:  
[P]ersons who have been designated … are effectively prisoners of the state … 
moreover, the way the system is administered affects not just those who have been 
designated. It affects third parties too, including the spouses and other family 
members of those who have been designated. For them too it is intrusive to a high 
degree.93  
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 Lord Hope went on to state that: 
The consequences of the Orders … are so drastic and so oppressive that we must be 
just as alert to see that the coercive action that the Treasury [has] taken really is within 
the powers that the 1946 Act has given them. Even in the face of the threat of 
international terrorism, the safety of the people is not the supreme law. We must be 
just as careful to guard against unrestrained encroachments on personal liberty.94  
Nonetheless, the approach of the Supreme Court in 2010 in the Ahmed case was limited 
by its previous decision in Al Jedda of 2007,95 which was only reversed by the European 
Court of Human Rights in 2011.96 The UK Supreme Court may revisit its decision in 
the light of that 2011 judgment when given the opportunity.97 However, in 2010 the 
Supreme Court felt bound by its previous decision in Al Jedda to the effect that 
obligations arising as a result of Security Council decisions must prevail over 
obligations to protect and uphold human rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, to deny the applicants any remedies under the Human Rights Act 1998 
that implemented Convention rights in UK law.98 By viewing the human rights avenue 
as blocked, the Supreme Court turned to domestic law, stating that the primacy clause 
in Article 103 was only applicable to conflicting obligations arising under international 
treaties,99 to find that the Al-Qaida and Taliban Order violated the complainants’ right 
to the enjoyment of their property, ‘which could only be interfered with by clear 
legislative words’,100 and their right to ‘unimpeded access to a court’, which ‘is not be 
to be excluded except by clear words’;101 while the Terrorism Order violated the 
fundamental rights of the citizen by introducing a reasonable suspicion test without the 
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 authority of Parliament.102 Both Orders were therefore ultra vires the United Nations 
Act 1946. 
 Lord Hope’s statements warn about the dangers of leaving such measures to the 
‘uncontrolled judgment of the executive’, but also address the argument that the UK 
should honour its obligations under the Charter arising from Security Council 
resolutions:  
But these resolutions are the product of a body of which the executive is a member as 
the United Kingdom’s representative. Conferring an unlimited discretion on the 
executive as to how those resolutions, which it had a hand in making, are to be 
implemented seems to me to be wholly unacceptable. It conflicts with the basic rules 
that lie at the heart of our democracy.103 
Despite these ringing words in Ahmed, the Supreme Court’s reliance on rights under 
domestic law to declare that the executive orders promulgated without Parliamentary 
scrutiny under the United Nations Act 1946 were ultra vires the 1946 Act on the basis 
that it did not expressly permit the infringement of individual rights, proved to be a 
brief victory for civil liberties and the rule of law.104  
 The Ahmed judgment led to the government curing the ‘defects’ of the executive 
orders by tabling primary legislation in the form of the Terrorism Asset-Freezing 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 2010. In the debates about the Terrorism Asset-Freezing 
Bill of 2010, which was to replace the temporary Act, some reference was made to the 
Supreme Court’s judgment, with one MP referring to Lord Brown’s statement that ‘the 
draconian nature of the regime imposed under these asset-freezing Orders can hardly 
be over-stated’.105 This was understood to mean ‘not that these were draconian because 
they were orders, but that they were draconian because of their content. So we need to 
be careful before reintroducing measures that are very similar to those orders’.106 The 
point that measures could be the same whether made directly by executive order 
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 pursuant to the 1946 Act or by executive order pursuant to a 2010 Act of Parliament 
seemed to be lost on the House. The reality was better reflected by a statement by one 
MP that during his 23 years in the House he found that ‘whenever the word “terrorism” 
appears in any order or other legislation, there tends to be cross-party support’.107  
X. Conclusion 
Law-making that is a combination of international and national executive decision-
making offends the rule of law in the sense used in this chapter because the executive 
has been allowed by Parliament and the Courts to by-pass human rights guarantees. The 
international and national executives have harnessed the supranational potential of the 
UN so that UK law is subject to the decision-making of the Security Council which, 
though located within a treaty and therefore a legal instrument, is almost wholly 
uncontrolled by that instrument or by the judicial mechanisms created by it, as 
evidenced by the International Court’s judgments in the Lockerbie cases. Plato warned 
that ‘where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the 
collapse of the state … is not far off’.108  
 Thus far the UK Supreme Court has failed to adopt a strong presumption that 
human rights obligations should not be overridden by obligations arising under Security 
Council resolutions, in contrast to European judgments discussed above.109 Those 
judgments leave a number of questions unanswered, including the relationship between 
international, regional and national legal orders, but they do invite the UK to look more 
closely at ways of upholding its human rights obligations while respecting security 
duties arising out of Security Council decisions. 
 The analysis in this chapter has shown that the UN was not simply an 
improvement on the cooperative model of international organisation embodied in the 
League of Nations. The UN Charter contained elements of centralisation and 
supranationality that had the potential, when the geopolitical context allowed, to 
unleash a federalising international order. In discussing processes of federalisation 
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 Livingston warns that centralised instruments created to solve problems become part of 
the governmental architecture and, furthermore, can easily become outdated and 
difficult to remove. The idea of a federation of ‘Great Powers’ in the core membership 
of the Security Council, including the UK and France, is no longer valid, and the idea 
of a world government in matters of peace and security in the hands of five states, 
formed out of the alliance forged in the Second World War, bears little resemblance to 
the multipolar and changing world in which we live. Livingston states further:  
As the nature of society changes, demands for new kinds of instrumentalities are 
created and these demands are met by changing or abolishing old instrumentalities 
and substituting new ones in their place. But it can scarcely be hoped that the new 
instrumentalities will keep pace with the changing pattern of social relationships, and 
as a result the pattern of instrumentalities tends to lag behind the changes in society 
itself … This is complicated further by the fact that the instrumentalities, once put into 
operation, become rigidified and acquire status of their own.110 
Hence, what started in 1945 as a new kind of instrumentality, namely an executive 
instrument for action on matters of international peace and security, has become a 
centralised governing and law-making body and the pivotal component of a federalising 
international legal and political order, increasingly encroaching on national legal and 
political orders, but only possessing the most rudimentary elements of accountability to 
those national orders. There are examples of states refusing to comply with Security 
Council sanctions, for example African states with regard to the measures imposed on 
Libya in 1992 for its alleged support of terrorism,111 but such non-compliance is unlikely 
in the case of the UK as it is part of the UN executive. 
 Tushnet, in considering national federal systems, makes the following point: 
Federal systems in the modern world drift towards centralization because of 
globalization and the dominance of a legal realist legal culture. The rate of drift, 
however, is affected by elements in the design of federal institutions. A constitutional 
specification of powers to be exercised solely by national units, a priori judicial 
review, a dual judiciary, and judges trained in formalist traditions all retard the drift 
towards centralization.112  
At the international level there is a drift towards centralisation in the Security Council 
for certain security matters, which can only be countered by states asserting their 
sovereignty, not to exclude human rights criticism as has occurred in the past, but to 
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 protect the human rights they have agreed to uphold. National judiciaries, as well as 
regional courts, will have to compensate for the International Court of Justice’s inherent 
weaknesses as a court of review, and reliance by courts on agreed human rights norms 
as opposed to accepting realist arguments based on security, will further limit the drift 
towards a federalising international order. 
 In order to nudge security obligations towards rule of law compliance at both 
international and national levels, UK courts will need to develop a more critical and 
coherent approach to the obligations arising under the Charter in order to reconcile 
those obligations with ones arising from human rights and other treaties. Article 103 
was not intended, and in any case should not be seen, as a constitutional supremacy 
clause to be relied upon to make it easier for the Security Council and governments (ie 
executive powers) to take unconstrained and open-ended security measures; it was 
intended as a conflicts clause drafted to ensure that states could not refuse to carry out 
their obligations arising under the Charter by dint of pre-existing and directly 
conflicting treaty obligations, for example under trade agreements.113 Furthermore, 
national Parliaments have to bear a greater burden of scrutiny of processes and 
legislation that implement these obligations and potentially undermine human rights 
and civil liberties, since it will only be by a combination of national political and judicial 
scrutiny that the executive encroachment on basic rights on the grounds of security will 
be checked.  
 A largely unchecked amalgam of international and national executives has 
utilised powers granted in the UN Charter to develop an extremely strong and 
overriding coercive regime of targeted sanctions, but an extremely weak one in terms 
of rule of law compliance. In straightforward terms, these ‘sanctions’ are not imposed 
in response to breaches of national or international law, but on the basis of suspicion of 
involvement in terrorism. The origins of this regime in the political discretion of the 
Security Council, where decisions on sanctions are taken largely behind closed doors,114 
signifies that when decisions impact directly and significantly on domestic legal orders 
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 and the rights of individuals therein, the result is the creation of federalised security 
measures that have been permitted by weaknesses in the national constitutional order 
to erode the rule of law in the UK. The current consensus in the Security Council that 
has driven this development is, so far, confined to non-forcible measures, but there is 
always a possibility of its extension to forcible measures. In August 2015, the UK 
government authorised a drone strike in Syria against an individual belonging to Islamic 
state, as an act of self-defence of the UK as well as Iraq.115 Although not authorised by 
the Security Council, that body took a step in the direction of sanctioning targeted 
killings when, following terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, it adopted what 
appeared to be a non-binding resolution that called upon states to take ‘necessary 
measures’ (Security Council code for the use of force) against Islamic State in Syria 
and Iraq.116 This falls short of authorising targeted killings of suspected terrorists, 
particularly those within the UK, but the fact that it is a step towards the centralised 
sanctioning of such uses of force illustrates the dangers of an unchecked creeping 
federalising international order.  
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